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The Drama of the Eastern Front

To those who are acquainted with the military history of the last war it appears that a fascinating strategic drama is about to be enacted on the eastern front. Then as now, the Russians advanced rapidly with large armies to the borders of East Prussia. One, under General Rennenkampf, hit straight at Königsburg around the north side of the Masurian Lakes, while another, under General Sazonov, came up from the south of these lakes. The Germans, under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, followed the Schlieffen plan by denuding their line against Rennenkampf in order to throw their whole force against Sazonov, upon whom they inflicted a disastrous defeat at Tannenberg. They then swiftly shifted their forces back, using strategic railways and highways, and stopped Rennenkampf. Will they attempt to use the same plan again, and if so, how will the Russians deal with it?

Obviously the situation is somewhat different because the Russians are far better commanded and equipped this time, and their armies are likely to employ better liaison and coöperation. They have, furthermore, a vastly superior air force with which to interrupt German troop movements. It is also possible that they will avoid the whole trap by holding back their advance into East Prussia until they have made much further progress to the south.

Slow Headway in Normandy

Ever since the capture of Cherbourg, Americans have been impatient about the slow progress of the Allied forces invading Normandy, especially in view of the swift onrush of the Russians in the east. On

the surface at least, it looks as if the Germans are succeeding in their plan to contain the Normandy beachhead. Our difficulties are obvious there: the nature of the terrain which permits the defense to fight from hedgerow to hedgerow and interferes with Allied use of heavy mechanized equipment; the rivers and marshes flooded by the Germans, which, combined with the narrow space, interfere with the deployment of large forces; and the time necessary to repair the port installations at Cherbourg. It should be remembered, however, that a stalemate due to similar conditions existed for weeks on the Italian front, but that when sufficient forces became available the German defense was overwhelmed.

Whether or not the Germans have sufficient strategic reserves to cope with an Allied break-through is apparently a matter of dispute among military men and is certainly a closed secret to the layman. It is certain that the German commanders have spared nothing in their effort to hamper or if possible to stop the Allied advance. Meanwhile there always remains the possibility that General Eisenhower will soon find the moment ripe for a new landing in another sector—a possibility which he continually keeps before the eyes of the enemy by his repeated warnings to fishermen that they should stay in their harbors.

FDR as Commander-in-Chief

Mr. Roosevelt said in his letter announcing he would accept the Democratic nomination, that just as it is the duty of every soldier to obey the orders of his military superior, it would be his own duty as Commander-in-Chief to accept the orders of his superiors, the American people, if they wished him to remain

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in office. Republican publicity has attempted to distort the meaning of this statement by implying that Mr. Roosevelt was using his prestige as Commander-in-Chief to order people to vote for him. This of course is the exact opposite of what he said.

There is, however, a more dangerous angle in the attack of the Republicans on the President for his use of the title. They have asserted that while of course the Constitution specifically gives the President this rank, it really means nothing, and the war is actually being conducted by professionally trained generals and admirals. Mr. Dewey in his acceptance speech played on this theme by a weasel-worded passage to the effect that if the President has not been interfering with the military men there will be no change when he goes into office, but that if the President has been interfering, he will end what he regards as a deplorable practice.

The truth is that the President has not been meddling with details of strategy and tactics which are beyond his competence, but that he has accepted the real responsibility which the Constitution intended to be his and which must be delegated to the Chief Executive in any real democracy. It is a first principle that the military must at all times be in the end subordinate to civil authority. It is also a first principle that war is, in the last analysis, an instrument of political government, and many of the major decisions must be taken by those who have political responsibility.

This is true at the present time in every one of the Allied countries, it was true in this country during the First World War and during the Civil War under President Lincoln. If Mr. Dewey intends to take no responsibility whatever as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, he is not fit to be President. The Republicans would have a perfect right to attack Mr. Roosevelt for the way in which he has exercised this power, but they probably would not have much luck with public opinion if they did so.

Dewey and Soldiers' Votes

It has been clear from the beginning that the Unholy Alliance of Republicans and reactionary Southern Democrats has been doing all in its power to put obstacles in the way of voting in the armed forces. Governor Dewey himself has now continued this tendency by failing to accept the federal ballot for New York voters before the deadline established by congressional law. The New York legislation in this matter, which he sponsored, is clumsy and will materially reduce the number of ballots that can be cast by those in combatant areas who happen to be residents of this state. The only way in which to counteract this deliberate sabotage of democracy is for every relative or friend of a soldier to express his indignation by voting against Mr. Dewey.

Dangerous Army Censorship

Political censorship by the army gets more and more ridiculous, not to say dangerous. An amendment to the Hatch Act, sponsored by Senator Robert Taft, forbid the army to distribute "political propaganda" to soldiers. Senator Taft was apparently just trying to express his hatred of the Roosevelt administration, but the literal-minded army has been taking the law with great seriousness, and has refused to assist the distribution to soldiers of anything which, by the remotest interpretation, could be called political. Dr. Charles A. Beard's new book, "The Republic," Catherine Drinker Bowen's biography of the late Mr. Justice Holmes, and other volumes just as non-political, have been forbidden circulation in a special army edition.

Now the army has also forbidden the distribution through official channels, of a number of magazines including *The New Republic*, *The Nation*, Harper's *The Atlantic Monthly* and *The American Mercury*. I continue, however, to distribute *The Reader's Digest*, *Time*, *Life*, *Collier's*, *The Saturday Evening Post*, *Cosmopolitan*, *American*, *Liberty* and some others. This discrimination looks on its face to be complete nonsense. Nearly all the magazines that are permitted to be circulated contain just as much political discussion as do the others, which are forbidden to be sold at post exchanges, or to be circulated in army libraries, hospitals, clubs, etc. The disturbing fact is that nearly all the magazines the army accepts are thoroughly conservative and are Republican, while nearly all those rejected are liberal and pro-New Deal.

The War Department, recognizing the dangerous political discrimination in which it is indulging, say that it circulates those magazines for which the soldier have expressed their preference. But this again is pure nonsense; it means accepting the magazines of large circulation and rejecting those with fewer readers. The Hatch law says nothing about any such discrimination; the magazines now accepted violate this law just as completely as those rejected. It looks to us as though Senator Taft had made a fool of himself and of the army, with the help of some bungling officers. He now says he will try to straighten the matter out; we hope he succeeds.

De Gaulle and the President

General de Gaulle's visit to the United States has turned out well. The French Provisional Government is now given de-facto recognition by both Britain and the United States, and will conduct civil affairs in all liberated territory. If the United States got any concessions from de Gaulle in exchange for this recognition, nobody knows what they are. It is our guess that there are no concessions of any importance, and we believe that when the history of the whole affair is written, it will prove a simple one. Anti-de Gaullism

like Admiral Leahy and Robert Murphy worked on President Roosevelt, and de Gaulle himself annoyed the President by his uncompromising attitude at Casablanca; the President thereupon erected his dislike into a principle; the pressure of time and events made the principle untenable, and he had to climb down. We wish the change had come sooner; but it is better late than not at all.

A New Chance in India

Mahatma Gandhi has made two important declarations in the course of a few days. In one, he said the Hindus would not oppose the creation of a separate Moslem state in India, under certain not unreasonable conditions. In the second he proposed that the Indian National Congress should give full support to the war, with a new Indian-controlled civil government but with all military affairs reserved to the Viceroy, Viscount Wavell. The first of his offers is showing up the hypocrisy of certain Moslem leaders who insisted that they wanted a separate government of their own, not in good faith but to embarrass the movement for independence. The second proposal may have a similar effect in regard to some of the British who have been saying they would like to grant independence, but Hindu intransigence makes this impossible. Mr. Gandhi's statements perhaps reflect the persuasiveness of Mr. Rajagopalachari, who holds the same views. In any case they open the door for an immediate resumption of negotiations on the basis of the plan proposed by Sir Stafford Cripps. There is every reason why this should be done at once; there is no good reason for further delay.

Against "Cotton Ed" Smith

Progressive citizens of South Carolina have a chance to show where they stand by voting against United States Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith in the primary on July 25. By now, "Cotton Ed's" record and personality should be pretty familiar to the people of South Carolina. In the most recent New Republic congressional voting chart, he had only three right votes out of eighteen. He voted against UNRRA, against the National Resources Planning Board, against the Farm Security Administration and the TVA. He voted repeatedly against keeping prices down. He opposed the President on vetoes of the tax bill and the Smith-Connally bill. He was against the federal soldiers' ballot and the Fair Employment Practice Committee. He was against cloture on the poll-tax question. The American Congress would be a better place with "Cotton Ed" missing after next January.

A Real Democrat in China

Americans in recent months have read a good many rather harsh things about the Chungking government of China. We have been told that it is tending danger-

ously toward autocracy, is drifting away from the people, is unreasonable in its continuing quarrel with the communists, and so on. Without denying this general indictment, we may point out that there are still some good democrats in Chungking, who are not afraid to speak their minds. We have recently seen two addresses by Dr. Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat-sen and president of the legislative branch of the national government, which are models, not only of democratic faith but of plain speaking. Certainly, no country which permits such forthright discussion is past redemption.

In one of his addresses, reprinted in the July issue of *Asia and the Americas*, Dr. Sun says, after reciting a history of the Kuomintang, that

in these twenty years the machinery and practice of the Kuomintang have turned in a wrong direction, inconsistent with the party constitution drafted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1923 and contrary to the spirit of democracy. The practice of the revolutionary party has consequently become the same as that of a bureaucratic regime. . . . We have come to regard ourselves as if we were the sovereign power entitled to the enjoyment of a special position and to the suppression of all criticism whatsoever against us. It is dictatorship and tyranny which the peoples of the world today are trying to destroy by means of sacrifices of their lives and blood. For these reasons we must, first of all, reorientate our psychology and correct our attitude of intolerance.

In another address by Dr. Sun, not yet published in this country, he discusses the future of the San-Min-Chu-I, the elite youth corps created, in theory, to provide new national leaders for China. Dr. Sun says that, unfortunately, these gilded youths are not learning to think for themselves, but are becoming mere puppets engaged in clicking their heels whenever the name of Chiang Kai-shek is mentioned. He says severely that British and Americans don't leap to their feet and click their heels when the name of Mr. Churchill or Mr. Roosevelt is mentioned. (He kindly omits to mention those, in this country at least, who leap to their feet



"Herr Canute" and the Rising Tide

and gnash their teeth on such occasions.) Dr. Sun paints a terrifying picture of universal local gangsterism in the towns and villages, and pleads that the youth corps should be used to democratize China at this grass-roots level. It is obvious that a man with his honesty, instinct for democracy and courage might easily play a great role in a China which was turning in a democratic direction.

On the Normandy Beach

When the war is over, the editors of Time magazine will have a peculiar problem of their own. They will need to explain to a lot of indignant servicemen why they said, in their first issue after the invasion of Normandy, that "little opposition" was encountered on the beaches. True, that issue of Time was prepared with lightning speed, and was on the whole amazingly accurate. True, also, the American censorship was at fault in failing to reveal all the details of the landings, which in fact did encounter, in certain areas, less opposition than was expected. Nevertheless, copies of that issue of Time, when it reached Normandy, caused some hard feelings among the soldiers who took part in the first landings. One of them, in the artillery, sends The New Republic an account of what he himself saw, to explain how the men feel:

I crossed the Channel [he writes] in an LST with a barrage balloon riding on the stern. We reached the beach on schedule, noon of D-Day, and got all set to land, but we couldn't. We really sweated out the delay, because the water was mined, the Germans had 88's shooting across the beach, and after dark a few German planes came over and strafed our decks and dropped bombs, mostly into the water (although there were so many ships you couldn't see how the bombers could miss hitting something).

The worst part of the waiting was that we had no way of knowing what was going on, so we thought that everything was snarled up and out of control, which wasn't true. We had battle stations on the LST and the alarm rang constantly all that first night, in fact every time a German plane came over. My station was amidships, right in the middle of things. At the alarm all the bulkheads were fastened shut and there we were, in the middle of nowhere, with a tiny escape hatch the only way out in case we got hit. We were dressed in all our equipment too; I'm sure we could never have squeezed through the hatch. One bomb fell just off our bow and it made so much noise we all thought we had been hit, but we weren't allowed to move around unless ordered to do so. We just sat there cursing; boy, how we wanted to get off that damned ship and get our feet on land and start shooting our howitzers! The fact of the matter was, although we had no idea of it at the time, that our infantry was still fighting to secure the ground just beyond the beach and there wasn't any place ashore for the artillery to go.

About noon of D-plus-1, the Colonel took me and a tommy gunner ashore in a small boat to find out the cause of the delay. We wandered all over the beach looking for

other battalions and trying to find out what was the matter. We had to jump off in water up to our necks and then walked for miles and miles. The wreckage on that beach human and material, was fantastic. The Germans were still shelling the beach with a couple of 88's and their snipers in the cliffs were firing at everything that moved. We walked past so many dead men and so many shattered jeeps and smashed landing craft that I couldn't believe there was anybody left alive ahead of us.

That's why it makes us laugh (and "laugh" is cleaning it up) when Time says that "no opposition developed."

Roosevelt Is Not Enough

NOW THAT MR. ROOSEVELT has made certain his nomination for another term, many liberals will be content to sit back with the conviction that all that remains is to elect him. Certainly he is far preferable as an individual to Mr. Dewey. The Democratic Party, with all its obvious faults, is likely to be less obstructionist to the measures necessary for a peaceful and livable world than the Republican. Nevertheless, there will continue to be a great danger of losing the peace if nothing more than this is accomplished.

Although the question may be decided before this issue is read, it is still pertinent to say that we need Henry A. Wallace as Vice President. This is not just because there is always a chance that the Vice President may have to step into the White House, and a man is required who can be trusted to carry on the progressive policies which from the beginning have provided the chief strength and the historical function of the present administration. There are other possible nominees who might be expected to do this. Indeed, if we were reduced to a choice of evils, almost anyone whom the Democrats may nominate for the vice-presidency would be preferable to Mr. Bricker. But Mr. Wallace is important as a symbol. His defeat might be interpreted as a warning to any successor that he would not be wise to be too honest and outspoken in carrying on the progressive tradition. On the other hand, Mr. Wallace's victory would be a sign to all that the enemies he has made are not to have things their own way. It might indeed strongly influence the tendency of the President himself.

For it must be remembered that Mr. Roosevelt is not just an advocate of ideals and policies, but also an inveterate compromiser who yields to pressure groups whenever necessary to maintain the general trend in which he is interested. He has no stomach for a fight which he fears he will lose. When conservative forces, either within or without his party, appear to be gaining the upper hand, he will yield something to them. Usually he will not yield all they want, but his daily course is determined largely by his political sense as to where power lies. This explains the many contradictions in his policies and the strange bedfellows who

appear in his administration. If Mr. Roosevelt is to be a useful instrument of human progress, he must be surrounded by political forces which make it possible for him to move in the required direction. He will not, and could not if he would, do everything alone.

Whether or not Mr. Wallace is nominated, it will be even more important to nominate and elect Senators and Representatives who can be relied upon not to sabotage the peace. This means choosing men who are in favor not only of international political organization, but of the economic measures, both at home and abroad, without which such organization would be a thin façade. We saw last time what a hostile Congress could do to the plans of President Wilson—and in that case not even a majority of Congress was hostile. The present anti-Roosevelt coalition in the national legislature is far larger than the forces opposing the previous war President.

Mr. Wilson was the opposite of a compromiser, and many believe he could have obtained the substance of what he wanted if he had not been so inflexible about senatorial reservations. It is reported that Mr. Roosevelt himself believes this and intends to be guided by Mr. Wilson's mistakes. Sensible as this attitude may be, it renders it all the more important that Mr. Roosevelt be provided with a Congress, and with a public opinion back of it, which will not permit so many compromises. Nothing would do more to strengthen the President's international and progressive tendencies than a series of decisive defeats in the primaries and at the polls of isolationists, "nationalists," supporters of cartels and monopolies, opponents of domestic progressive legislation.

Only recently the nation had a frank warning of what it might expect if the coalition of Democratic and Republican reactionaries retain their hold on Congress. While the international monetary conference at Bretton Woods was in progress, Senator Taft predicted that Congress would never ratify either the international-exchange-stabilization fund or the international bank which are the chief items on its agenda. These proposals were jointly worked out by the experts of the United Nations, and if recommended by the official delegates and ratified by their governments, will become the cornerstone of United Nations economic policy. This is not the place to discuss Mr. Taft's arguments in detail, but the essence of them is that the United States does not want power over these matters delegated to an international body. He wants the United States to act in them unilaterally. This is the essence of isolationism. There is little doubt that in domestic policies so those who agree with Mr. Taft and will vote as he predicts will sabotage full employment.

Even Mr. Roosevelt himself may be defeated unless the largest possible number of citizens get excited enough about the elections to register and vote. The fewest of political analysts have come to the con-

clusion that his chances depend almost entirely on the number who cast ballots, and particularly on the numbers of industrial workers and young people who vote—the latter being largely in the armed forces and therefore subject to such voting restrictions as may be put into effect by the Governors of the states in which they live.

More is at stake than it is comfortable to imagine. The next four years will be even more critical in the history of this country and of the world than the last four. With Dewey in the presidency, the opportunity will almost certainly be lost. With Roosevelt, the opportunity may be lost. Once the fighting stops, he will be powerless unless Congress and a majority of the people demand adequate measures. Indeed, we are almost tempted to say that if such a thing were conceivable, it would be better to have Dewey with a progressive Congress than Roosevelt with one like the present.

The function of democracy is not just to pick out a leader and then to leave everything to him. It is also to give the leader a lead, indeed, to force his hand when he becomes tired or careless. The chief argument against the President is that it is unhealthy for the country to regard one man as indispensable. This argument would fade if it became evident that there was an aroused popular opinion driving him on. The weakness of the progressives in recent years is that they have not controlled the major political forces outside of the White House. Let them speak in their own right, and elect their own candidates in villages, congressional districts and states. If they do, not only will Mr. Roosevelt be elected, but he will listen to them and act in their behalf, and Congress will support him in doing so. If they do not, their opponents will rule. The only safeguard, not only of Roosevelt's election but of his progressive power and tendency, will be, not a choice which will appear to the voters one between evils, but a spirited and convinced campaign for positive goals.

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Prosperity After the War

I. The Chance of Full Employment

Will the United States have prosperity or depression after the war? Or a little of the first, followed by the other? The New Republic has invited Dr. W. S. Woytinsky, an able economist in government employ in Washington, to comment on this subject in two articles of which this is the first. — THE EDITORS

IN THE CONTROVERSY on the chances of full employment and lasting prosperity in postwar America, history is on the side of the pessimists. Big talk on the far-reaching goals of World War I did not prevent an orgy of reaction after the Armistice, and long years of depression and mass unemployment followed the fictitious prosperity of the twenties. Why should postwar America succeed where prewar America failed? The burden of proof is on those who visualize postwar America as a land of plenty with an economy balanced at a high level of production, consumption and employment.

Economic conditions in postwar America are being determined now, by the peculiar characteristics of our war economy. These characteristics are apparent when one compares the pattern used in this country in mobilizing human and technical resources for war with the measures used for the same purpose in other belligerent countries—for example, Great Britain.

Neither country deliberately chose its type of war economy. The British pattern was shaped by the agony of Dunkirk, the blitz over London, Britain's narrow escape from invasion and the threat of a hunger blockade by German submarines. It was also influenced by her experience in the last war and by her dependence on imports and exports. The war economy in the United States has been molded by fundamentally different factors. Its general outlines were determined by the defense program of 1941, which was superimposed on a peacetime economy recovering from the depression of the thirties and gradually gaining momentum when this country was suddenly plunged into a struggle for survival.

This difference in origin explains the contrast between the two types of war economy. The British system is more austere, rigid, heroic; it rests on the spirit of individual sacrifice for national preservation, kindled by the German bombs and the ruin of British cities. The American system is looser, more individualistic; beyond appealing to patriotism, it is based on the principle of economic incentive. Apart from being "exceedingly comfortable," as described once by Secretary of the Interior Ickes, this brand of war economy has

the advantage of requiring less regimentation than any other system. Instead of assigning a particular duty to each able-bodied man and woman, the government distributes orders to industries, enabling them to pay wages which will attract workers.

Impressive results have followed our policy of assuring incentive wages for workers, incentive profits for employers and incentive prices for farmers. National output increased from \$89 billion in 1939 to \$97 billion in 1940, \$119 billion in 1941, \$152 billion in 1942, \$187 billion in 1943, and is likely to reach \$215 billion in 1944. The precise role of inflation in this dance of billions is unknown: according to the official price index, national production in 1943 may be estimated at 155 billion "1939 dollars," but the figure will be somewhat less if due weight is given to hidden price rises.

At a very rough approximation, the amazing expansion of war production in the United States may be explained in the following terms:

	<i>Increases 1939-4</i>
More workers employed	12 per cent
Longer hours of work	20 "
Larger output per man hour	20 "
Increase in output	61 per cent

Approximately half the national output is being used for war and other public needs, the other half for civilians. Since the war has practically stopped private capital formation, direct consumption (at least in nondurable goods) has been held at a very high level despite the spectacular output of war material.

To complete the picture of our war economy, should be mentioned that not much more than half our war expenditure is covered by taxes, while the other half is financed by borrowing. In round figures the government takes 50 percent of the national output in goods and services but receives only 25 percent of the value of this output in taxes. The corollary is that civilians have disposable income representing about 25 percent of the value of goods and services produced for the nation, but can buy only 50 percent of the same aggregate. Thus, there is a gap between public outlay and receipts and an approximately equal gap between private incomes and expenditures.

On one side of the ledger of our type of war economy are rising prices, strenuous work and the strain

¹ The combined effect of the factors enumerated here is attained not by addition but by multiplication: $1.12 \times 1.20 \times 1.20 = 1.6128$. The total increment is 61 percent, in round figures.

ures of war, on the other side is a nearly universal rise in earnings. The average American family receives about twice its prewar earnings, spends only a little more than before and, after having paid taxes, puts aside—in war bonds or other savings—approximately 20 percent of its current earnings, or some 40 percent of its prewar income. At the same time, the national debt grows at an annual rate of 25 percent of the value of the current national output.

This dual process is likely to have a lasting effect on our postwar economy.

The national debt increased from \$45 billion at the end of 1940 to \$167 billion at the close of 1943, and some students believe that it will rise to \$300 or even \$350 billion by the end of the war. Net savings of individuals and business enterprises are estimated by the United States Department of Commerce, at \$17 billion in 1941, \$30.5 billion in 1942, and \$38.4 billion in 1943—that is, nearly \$86 billion in three years. This figure should be increased to perhaps \$100 billion if one adds unused depreciation reserves of business and accrued interest. The ultimate total will depend upon the duration of the war, the extent of the war effort, the movement of prices, and tax policy.

Assuming that the war in Europe ends by the close of this year and that two years more are necessary to subdue Japan, that the tax policy and the general framework of the war economy remain about the same as at present and that prices and wages continue to advance slowly, without runaway inflation, it appears probable that the savings of American families and business in the remaining war years will approximate \$50 to \$55 billion annually. Under these conditions, some \$250 billion may have been accumulated by the population in war savings. With unused depreciation reserves of business and with accrued interest, the amount may reach \$300 billion.

This figure is not given as a forecast. War savings may total considerably more than \$300 billion if the war lasts longer than has been assumed above or is more expensive, and if prices and wages advance more rapidly. On the other hand, the total may be much lower than \$300 billion if the war ends sooner, if the victory is won at a lower price, if wages and prices are frozen at the present level and if taxes are increased.

At the end of the war, approximately 66 million individuals will be in the labor force—about 11 millions under arms and some 55 millions in civilian pursuits. With unemployment of about one million, approximately 54 million persons will be at work—12 millions in agriculture (seasonal peak) and 42 millions in non-agricultural pursuits. Of this number approximately nine million workers will be employed in munitions industries, and perhaps as many more will be in industries indirectly related to war. Assuming only a moderate rise in wages and prices in the later course of the war, the national output will not be far from \$220 bil-

lion a year—half for public use, half for private consumption and capital formation.

Contrary to widespread opinion, reconversion of the economic system to full peacetime employment does not postulate that jobs must be provided for 11 million ex-servicemen and 17 or 18 million workers laid off by war industries, or that war contracts must be replaced, dollar for dollar, by civilian consumption. At present many people who ordinarily would neither have nor want paid jobs are employed in munitions factories and shipyards. For many millions the work day and work week have been lengthened. Growing industrial absenteeism and excessive labor turnover indicate the spread of fatigue. There is no reason to believe that people will want to work this way when the emergency is over. Neither is there any reason to believe that employers will continue to operate their plants more than 40 hours a week and to pay their workers for overtime.

Reconversion presumes withdrawal of temporary workers from the labor market, curtailment of hours of work and increase of "frictional" unemployment. All in all, the number of man hours worked may be cut by approximately 25 percent. If five million persons withdraw from the labor force, two to three million men remain in the standing armed forces, and hours of work in non-agricultural industries are rolled back to the prewar level, the number of additional peacetime jobs necessary for "full employment" will be nearer 13 than 28 million.

In terms of dollars, full employment after the war would require production of goods and services at a rate of approximately \$170 to \$180 billion annually at present prices, or \$120 to \$130 billion in prewar dollars. The postulate of peacetime full employment is that production and consumption must be raised 40 to 50 percent above the prewar level. Such an increase would reflect the growth of the population in active age groups (say, five percent); growing participation of women in gainful work (perhaps three percent); absorption of labor reserves unemployed in 1939 (15 percent); and technological progress (a 15-to-20-percent increase in average output per man hour).

The solution of the problem of full employment will be facilitated by several factors. The nation will not have to climb up from mass unemployment to full employment, but will rather go down from overemployment to a more comfortable level of economic activity. Because of the global character of this war, reconversion and demobilization will be stretched over a fairly long period of time, possibly two or three years. In this transition period, economic controls will probably be continued.

The postulated level of production and consumption is not visionary. Its feasibility can be proved readily by distributing 55 million jobs over more than a hundred industries and balancing a bill of goods and services

against a hypothetical list of needs and demands. The controversy between the optimists and the pessimists is not whether full employment is *possible*. The issue is whether stabilization at the postulated level of production and consumption is *probable* under the existing system.

In fact, full employment was theoretically possible in prewar America, but for some reason the system collapsed after a short spell of a comparatively high level of activity in the fools' paradise of the twenties. Will it collapse again, after a short postwar boom? If the answer is to be in the negative, what new factor must be added to our economic system in the reconversion so that this system will be able to make full use of its resources?

The United States will emerge from the war with greatly increased productive capacity, and an unprecedented concentration of economic power in the hands of

monopolistic and semi-monopolistic concerns and organizations. The system will be fairly rigid and full of contradictions—it will neither be the promised land of free enterprise nor yet a decaying economy ready to trade its birthright for the pottage of governmental regimentation and subsidies. No fundamental reconstruction of the existing system is visible. The much discussed plans for increasing its stability and efficiency do not go beyond good will of employers, streamlined taxation, compensatory spending by government, public works and some kind of regulation of wages. On almost every point, divergent solutions are proposed, and it is not clear which solution postwar America will choose.

In the second instalment we shall show how the particular pattern of war economy in the United States is preparing the foundations for lasting prosperity after the end of the war.

W. S. WOYTINSKY

Germany on the Eve of Invasion

THE HALLOWED BONES of Field Marshal von Hindenburg are bestirring themselves. But the occasion is not the ineffable moment so dear to Germans of whatever political persuasion—when German world hegemony will have become an actuality instead of a promise. No, far from it. There is a jeremiad abroad in the land, and well warranted at that. The "sacred soil" of Germany is about to be invaded by the hosts of the enemy. For the first time since the Napoleonic wars German land will resound to the march of the invader. Of course, there was a shallow invasion of East Prussia in August of 1914, but the rude intruder was soon defeated at Tannenberg and driven out. Too, there was an army of occupation in west Germany, but that was after, not before, German surrender in 1918. The Allied bombings have already violated the immunity of German territory. But that invasion, however telling, is mechanical, impersonal, and lacks the striking and lasting effect of concrete possession.

For the first time in more than a century the German population will come to know the glories of war: what it means to be in the path of artillery barrages, tank battles and infantry cross-fire in street fighting. For the first time they will receive visible proof of the fiction of their own invincibility. No more legends about a stab in the back of the German army by the civilian authorities. And the invader will not be the Americans, who, because they have never felt the German yoke, can indulge in sentimental caution lest we furnish the Germans with reason to hate us or in making an artificial dichotomy between Nazis and Germans. The invading armies in the east will be composed of those who have seen at first hand the devastation wrought by the German conqueror, whose homes have been looted and

destroyed, their families outraged and massacred. And behind these armies will follow some of the populations among whom human abattoirs have been operated. Of course only Germans could deal in a fitting manner with those responsible for these crimes. But when the Herrenvolk have to look into the eyes of the Russians, Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs and the rest, not as masters but as vanquished at the mercy of their conquerors, the accompanying fright, humiliation and helplessness may prove the best catharsis of Kultur yet and the best omen for the future peace of the world.

There is deep and satisfying historic irony in that East Prussia will be the first territory of the Third Reich to be subjugated—East Prussia, the seat of the Teutonic Knights, among the first fiefs of the Hohenzollerns and the cradle of Junkerdom. And what humiliation—East Prussia is likely to be given to the Poles, whom Clausewitz called Tartars and excluded from the European family of nations. The wheel of history will have made a full and just turn when the grave of von Hindenburg, together with the monument at Tannenberg, one of the great national shrines of modern Germany, feels the conqueror's heel. It was Hindenburg, the most typical of Junkers and the elected head of the Weimar Republic, who placed the scepter of power in the hands of Hitler and the Nazis.

But Hitler need not bother to plead with the hero of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes for the magic military formula to save Germany. There is none available even in Valhalla. Hindenburg faced Russian soldiers just as brave and devoted to their mother country as Napoleon did and Hitler now does. But the Russian armies Hindenburg faced were ill equipped and badly

led. Hitler's generals would be the first to admit a great difference in that respect now.

The Tannenberg victory occurred at the beginning of the last war when German power was at its peak, due to the unpreparedness of her neighbors. Now, we are approaching the end of World War II, when the sands of German resistance are running out. No precipitate shifting of forces from the west would help to stem the tide of the Russian flood. It could succeed only in weakening the dykes against the gathering storm from Anglo-American forces in the west. In this connection, Hindenburg might also remind Hitler that the three army corps shifted by the then Chief of Staff, Moltke, the younger and the lesser, from the west to the east to save East Prussia, so weakened the already attenuated right flank of the German armies which invaded Belgium and France that the French, and not the Germans, won the first battle of the Marne, thus causing the execution of the Schlieffen plan to go awry.

Nor can Hitler rely on indefinite withdrawals to avoid defeat or even to postpone it substantially. Of all the European countries, only Russia has the spaces to conduct a defensive based principally on retreat. Russia in her retreat of 1941-42 could look forward to the cumulative strength of a rallying coalition. There is no such prospect for Germany. General Ditmar, the official German commentator, declared that the German High Command was guilty of grave miscalculation in underestimating Russian strength. If so, there is nothing startling in this. To underestimate the rest of the world is a characteristically German psychosis. Otherwise Germany would not have involved herself twice in one generation in wars against the combined strength of Russia, Great Britain and the United States, not to mention the other nations. But it is difficult to believe that the German High Command was under the illusion that the relatively small German garrisons in the scattered strong points along the eastern front could be relied upon to stand off a major Russian attack. In 22 days the Russians have covered something like 265 miles. A speed of 25 to 30 miles a day, frequently reported by the Russians, is not fighting speed for any army. It is approximately top marching speed for the main body of troops. Except for severe but brief fighting at Vilna, and perhaps at Vitebsk, there has been virtually no large-scale fighting on the eastern front. This cannot be accounted for by demoralization of the German armies. There is no evidence of this in the west. Nor is even the Russian claim of German losses in casualties and prisoners—more than 200,000—an indication of collapse. Rather it is persuasive that the Russians have not yet met the main German armies. It is to borne in mind that we are not witnessing a break-through at some distant, peripheral point, like Finland or the Balkans. It is in White Russia and Poland, in the very center of the line, on the direct

and shortest route to Berlin. If this line is not worth defending, what is?

The reports from the eastern front are consistent with the following hypothesis: Except for garrisons left in a few strong points for the purposes of deception and camouflage, the main German armies in White Russia and Poland have been withdrawn to some line not yet reached by the Russians. The Russian First Baltic army under Bagramian is finding a similar vacuum in the Baltic states. Perhaps an invasion of the Balkans will disclose a like situation.

What is the possible nature and disposition of the German last line of defense to which the German troops are being withdrawn? Hitler's inner fortress can be said to be bordered on the southeast by the Carpathians and thence southwestward to the Alps. From the Alps northward to the sea, the Germans could rely upon the presumably reconstructed and extended Maginot and Siegfried Lines. But in the east, from the Carpathians to the Baltic for a distance of about 400 miles, there are no natural barriers such as mountains. It is exceedingly unlikely that the Germans have been able to construct substantial artificial fortifications in this region. German military thought did not function in defensive terms in the east; and the time has been too short since the danger in the east became apparent and German industry has been too strained to afford any opportunity to erect formidable barriers. The Germans in that level gap in Poland will have to depend on massed manpower alone for defense. It is doubtful whether even Lwow and Brest-Litovsk will serve as more than delaying outposts. Despite psychological considerations, it is unlikely that all of East Prussia will be considered defensible. Only the industrially important Czecho-Slovakia, Silesia and western Poland will be included in the inner ring. The last line of defense might run from the vicinity of Königsburg and Danzig down to around Warsaw and Lodz, and from there to Przemyśl and Krakow and down to the Carpathians. There the Nazi armies will have to make their last stand or leave the heart of Germany bared.

As the last break-through in the east or in the west becomes imminent there will come to the surface in Germany that atomization of the ruling power which follows panic born of defeat. Then the problem of surrender, by whom and to whom, will become actual and inescapable.

The German situation is desperate and hopeless but not critical—not in the classic sense anyway, for crisis denotes decision and Germany's military defeat was underwritten when Russia and the United States were drawn into the war. But like actors, though the end is known, the Allied armies must nevertheless play out their parts in blood and horror so that the curtain may come down on the twilight of the gods.

JOSEPH ROSENFARB

What to Do with Germany

III. *The Problem of the War Criminals*

THE UNITED NATIONS, silent about much else, have emphasized their determination to punish war criminals. The case for drastic action on a considerable scale is clear to all of us, but the difficulties are obvious. The Nazis have many hostages in their power, among them such men as Léon Blum, Breitscheid, Thälmann, Matchek and thousands of less celebrated prisoners. Again, their leaders may take refuge in neutral territory. Finally, there is the notorious difficulty of singling out those personally responsible from those who acted, perhaps unwillingly, under orders.

Under a dictatorship all responsibility centers at the top. Individual commanding officers transmitted the orders to massacre Jews, slaughter hostages and torture political prisoners. They cannot go scot-free. But the real authors of this orgy of crime were Hitler and the gang that created the Nazi Party. Again, their crime was not so much that they ordered barbarities, or even that they made this war. Their real crime was that they abolished morality and rooted it out in the mighty state they controlled. Everything else flowed from that.

But to reverse the moral values of civilized men is not a crime known to international law. Neither is the levying of aggressive war technically a crime, nor even the breach of treaties. An unwritten law there may be, but the powers have never drawn up an international criminal code, nor set up an international criminal tribunal. To build up the fundamental concepts of justice was the work of many centuries: are we to sweep them away in the heat of war? As little dare we pretend that enemies can fairly try an enemy. Whatever we do, then, with Hitler and his fellow political criminals, we ought not to try them.

If we permit the Germans to make a revolution, the new government will know how to deal with its internal enemies. In that case we must leave its actions free. The Germans have an even heavier account to settle with Hitler than we have.

Failing a German revolution, what should we do? History has left us a useful precedent. Napoleon was a less ignoble criminal than Hitler, but once again St. Helena or some equally remote island might serve our purpose. Hitler and all the heads of his party should be interned without trial, by an administrative act, in some isolated spot for the rest of their lives, under conditions worthy rather of our self-respect than of their deserts. Among these internees we would include all the higher ranks of the party—the experts in propaganda and the heads of the Gestapo and the SS, as well as the ministers and political chiefs. The worst

that could happen for the future relationship of our two peoples would be that Hitler should die with a halo of martyrdom around him. Mr. Churchill, pleading as a young man for clemency toward the Cape rebels during the Boer War, coined a memorable aphorism: "Grass grows quickly over the battlefield: over the scaffold never."

The Germans will have to consider whether and when they dare admit the rest of this perverted and guilty party to exercise the rights of citizens. The party had, at the height of its power, if we are correctly informed, about three million members. Of these a fairly high proportion may have joined it for safety or because they had to live, rather than from any deep conviction: but to balance these there are the thugs of the SS and the Gestapo. Would it not be a wise precaution to debar this whole mass membership from voting, at all events at the first election? It is more important that all who held offices of any sort in the party should be debarred for life from holding any political offices whatever, national or municipal, in the German state. Germans will also wish to confiscate these men's property, swollen as it commonly is by graft and extortion. Into these details we do not propose to enter, for they are the concern of the German nation. But its conduct in taking such measures will influence our future attitude toward it.

It remains to consider the case of the war criminals proper—the officers, that is to say, guilty of conspicuous atrocities in the conduct of the war or in the policing of the occupied countries. To these men the considerations we have urged in the case of the politicians do not apply. There is a recognized code of military law to which Germany subscribed. There are precedent dating from 1919, ill managed though they were, for the trial of such cases. A court-martial drawn from all the United Nations would be the fairest tribunal. Judges drawn from the state in which the crime was committed would find it hard to be impartial. Soldiers should try soldiers. The trials should be public, with every facility for the defense, and should take place as promptly as possible: we cannot go on shooting our former enemies long after hostilities have ceased. That is what Franco did, to the disgust of us all.

But it may now be too late to make suggestion about the trial of the war criminals. Decisions were reached by the conference of the three chief Allies in Moscow and published. It is laid down that the accused men shall be returned to the countries in which their crimes were committed, to be "judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged . . . according to

the laws of these liberated countries." It is easy to understand the sentiments that inspired this decision. It is much harder to grasp this conception of law and judicial procedure. The crimes these men committed were not offenses against the municipal laws of the lands they invaded. They were offenses against the rules of war laid down in the Hague Convention. Under that code they should be tried.

The first indispensable step in approaching the question of rebuilding the ruins is to banish all thought of punishment. Instead of asking how we can set guilty men to perform arduous tasks, should we not inquire how far machinery can help us? It is reasonable to demand from the Germans all sorts of machines required for digging, the clearing of sites, and construction. The next step is to organize the manufacture of pre-fabricated buildings and the mass-production of fittings and furniture. If we mean to organize the peoples of Europe as a working team, here is our chance. The scheme should be so devised as to assist rebuilding in Germany and Italy as well as in Allied lands, albeit it is fair that the Germans should make the maximum contribution toward it. The real test of our civilization is that we plan the rebuilding of Europe impartially all round and do it with the minimum of painful labor. It is in the general interest that our enemies should recover as quickly and completely as our friends. All of us, in the economic field, are interdependent.

It is right that German hands should build up what German hands tore down. This they can do by making machines and fittings in their own factories. But is this all they should do? After the last war, shortly before his assassination, Kurt Eisner, who led the brief but spirited revolution in Bavaria, made a memorable speech, which I heard, on the theme that the devastated cities of Belgium and France should be rebuilt by German labor. He offered to recruit and lead a corps of volunteer workers, who would undo the evil past with their hands, in a socialist spirit of fellowship. The offer was refused by the French and Belgian governments. French contractors wanted their profits, while French workers dreaded unemployment. It is only in a few rare cases that the idea might be acceptable in Western and Central Europe. Perhaps the Czechs might allow German volunteers to rebuild Lidice.

Russia alone could welcome a team of German workers without the dread of unemployment. But they should go as free men, who can claim in this workers' and peasants' republic the right as workers to be treated with respect. They should serve under their own foremen and architects and under the rules of their restored trade unions. The Russians would have to supply them on an agreed scale with food and shelter, while the German Republic would maintain their families and give them deferred pay on their return. There are in the Todt organization hundreds of thousands of skilled

and experienced builders and engineers, accustomed to working in a team, who would do the work of reconstruction better, more rapidly and with fewer hands than any body of criminals or conscripts. They would be glad to escape the unemployment that may descend on Germany. Meeting the Russians as fellow workers, they might succeed in lessening the hate the Nazis engendered.

It remains to consider what should be done with the SS men, hardened as they have been by the practice of every species of brutality. Left to their own devices, they will form terroristic gangs, half-criminal, half-political, like the "Free Corps" recruited after the last war. If these take to intimidation and assassination they can render a return to normal political life well-nigh impossible. These troops should be disarmed but not demobilized. They should be employed under strict discipline, as a pioneer corps, to rebuild the German towns shattered by our bombers. With their work some process of education might be blended—skillfully, without pedantry, by teachers who possess some psychological insight. The Nazis made criminals by their perverted system of education. Are there no better men and women with the wit to undo their work?

H. N. BRAILSFORD

This is the last of a series of three articles. — THE EDITORS

The Whales

Who were the whales?

Why did the whales go back to the sea?

What drove them off the land and sent them lumbering down the beaches back to the sea?

The sea is no place for whales

The sea is a penance for something whales have done on land

They suffer the sea for something that lost them forever
sod underfoot, tree-bark, the shelter of mountains

What is it that whales have done?

Who herded them off the plains, banished them out to the realm of barnacles and fish?

They lie offshore tonight

Beyond those rocks are whales riding the cold swell

As they suck and strain the sea do whales remember orchard grass, mangoes, muskmelons?

As they raise their lonely spouts do they remember trumpeting from hilltops?

The flap of their tails, does it bring back the feel of sugarcane thrashing against their legs?

Whales are sea-locked

They are bound by the anger of salt water

They are imprisoned forever in the long dark dungeon of the sea

PRESTON NEWMAN

Washington Notes

Political Finesse and Mr. Wallace

THE GREAT FINESSE with which President Roosevelt has handled political matters for the last dozen years seemed to escape him when he decided to announce his readiness to accept a fourth-term nomination. The letter to Chairman Hannegan was poorly written. Many persons here thought that it was "corny." It used "Commander-in-Chief" three times, which was laying it on a bit thick. The timing was bad if the President honestly wanted Wallace renominated with him. Its failure to mention him was an invitation to delegates who might have supported Wallace to begin a stampede away from him.

There has been much talk about the President having to force Wallace down the throats of the delegates if the Vice President is to be renominated. Where the forcing would be done would be in the throats of the Kelly-Hague-Flynn team and a few other such statesmen who dominate big batches of delegates. The Vice President hasn't busied himself doing them favors, protecting their interests or running their errands. They wanted to force somebody down the throats of the people.

The President's statement was taken by these gentry as a signal to find someone else. Nothing the President might do in the way of statements thereafter for Wallace would help much, for the stampede had been started—by the President. Rumors have circulated in the capital that the President was angered by Wallace's talk about freedom for the colonial peoples of the East, particularly in India and some of the Dutch possessions. The President also is supposed not to have liked Wallace's rather blunt report on the Chinese situation. Wallace leads with his chin—Roosevelt plays along, improvises, bides his time. Their characters and personalities are poles apart. It is surprising that they like each other personally.

Mr. Roosevelt said that he would not conduct a political campaign this year in the usual sense. But his letter to Hannegan had all the earmarks of a political document. It showed that the President will not take notice of the opposition, thus repeating the strategy employed in 1940. He will continue to be a wartime President above partisanship, devoting all his time to war duties, inspecting war plants and installations and probably visiting troops abroad.

Mr. Roosevelt's advisers are not so confident of victory at the polls as the President is reported to be. They believe that Governor Dewey will make an effective campaign, that he will run a smart race, making few of the tactical errors Mr. Willkie made four years ago.

The Democratic organization is not too strong. Dissensions have developed, and the high hopes that were placed in Bob Hannegan have been somewhat dissipated. He is an able professional politician, but he has made some blunders. He has not had big-time experience. The campaign he has waged against Wallace has made him enemies. Wallace supporters think he overstepped the bounds, that it was not the job of a national chairman to play favorites.

In a report full of optimism about the war, the Foreign Economic Administration has put its finger on one of the most vexing problems facing the United Nations: how to keep a powerful nation from being too strong. The nation is Germany. It is true that Germany had a great head start in preparing for the war, but the fact remains that it has taken a combination of the three other major powers to bring her to a position where her defeat is inevitable.

The report, written by William T. Stone, director of the FEA's Special Areas Branch, which handles economic-warfare analysis, points out that despite the bombing attacks and the Allied blockade, "the Germans succeeded in raising their war production in 1942 above 1941, and further succeeded in a moderate increase in 1943 over 1942. Except for the greatly increased scale of the Allied bomber offensive in 1943, the rise in German war production in that year would have been nearly a quarter over 1942." All this was accomplished despite the enormous problems of manpower and materials shortages. It again underscores the fact that the industrial power of Germany is substantial. Of course, Germany has had the industry of most of Europe to add to her own. But when industry in the occupied countries is taken from her, she will still have intact a great concentration within her own borders. If Germany is not again to become the great warrior nation, the United Nations will have to find a way to keep her in subjection or to help bring about a revolution in the will of the people. Germany will always have the means for building a war machine in the richness of her industry and natural resources.

Mr. Stone makes it very clear that the debt the world owes to Russia is incalculable. "Thanks largely to Russia, the Germans," he says, "have consumed nearly as much of all finished products of the war industries as they have produced in the last three years." Even so, the Germans have maintained an over-all inventory of finished weapons. "The factors that have held down German strength have only held it down. They have not yet cut it down and beaten it; only the all-around attacks which have now started can do that." But the basis has been provided "for an over-all scale of attack too great to be met," Mr. Stone concludes. The drain on German industry is now too heavy for it to withstand. Germany, therefore, faces "substantial certainty of defeat in 1945 if not in 1944."

Notes: The de Gaulle mission was a greater success than almost anyone believed possible. The General made a favorable impression even at the White House. He was well received wherever he went. . . . Many persons here believe that too much emphasis, in choosing a Vice President, is being placed on the President's health. That is no longer a cause for worry at the White House. . . . Diplomatic and military officials are not surprised by Germany's threat to turn Europe into a "maelstrom of destruction where only one cry is heard—the cry of blood." For a long time it has been known that if Germany saw defeat inevitable she would do all in her power to destroy what is left in the occupied countries. . . . Friends of Tommy Corcoran can't make up their minds whether he's fighting harder for Douglas or Rayburn for the vice-presidency.

Washington

T. R. B.

Hard-as-Nails Dept.

THE MOST neatly machined movie since "The Miracle of Morgan's Creek," and the meanest one since "The Maltese Falcon" (without being as good as either), is a murder melodrama called "Double Indemnity," which was taken from a James Cain story in which a good-bad insurance salesman and an all-bad Los Angeles housewife figure up a nearly foolproof way to kill the wife's husband and collect his insurance. At the end their crime is so nearly cracked by the insurance company's claims manager (Edward G. Robinson), and the two of them (Fred MacMurray and Barbara Stanwyck) have become so distrustful, sick to death and jealous of one another that they try to shoot each other to death. The whole bloody business is told by MacMurray in a flashback as he confesses into his friend's, the claims manager's, dictaphone.

The film is one in which the only people who aren't deceiving someone are either ferociously soured on life, or as dyspeptic and wry as the claims manager, or too foolish to bother with; the manner of getting on with one another, either in conversation, lovemaking or gunplay, is intended to produce an effect like that of two trains hitting head-on. Their conversation—the joint work of James Cain, Raymond Chandler and Billy Wilder—is as fancy and metaphorical as I have ever heard in a movie, so that sometimes they sound like detective-story writers turned gangster. For instance, when the hero wants to say that he must think something over, he says, "I'll have to drive it around a while," when he feels the conversation is positively finished he says, "That tears it." The motto that the wife and he use to describe how their partnership has to be is "It's got to be straight down the line." This produces some embarrassingly cute, candyish talk, as well as a good deal that is accurately and fatly descriptive.

The film on its own level is a smooth, talented job of writing and directing, with some very bright, realistic perceptions of the kind of people and places that rarely get into American movies, and some adequate playing—especially by the monolithic MacMurray, who is less that way than he has ever been, by Tom Powers as the soured husband, and by Robinson, who is a mousy creature, but an aggressive, masterful sleuth. However, it leaves me on the cold side of interested.

It seems to me to be slick, slight, arty and visually synthetic. The first murder is dependent on successfully projecting enough sex between the wife and the insurance agent to make a convincing murderer out of a man who is really too smart to murder anyone; the last two depend on successfully working up enough jealousy between them, hatred and fear of each other's suspected deceit, and concern on the man's part for the woman's step-daughter, to make their foolhardy turning on each other credible. The love affair seems too slight to drive the man into murder and to give the picture the great sense of passion and evil it needs, and which Cain himself often gets. Miss Stanwyck's brand of sulky, aloof coldness doesn't seem big enough, and isn't given a chance to make its evil quality effective. Their falling-out and everything else about the ending has a phony ring.

The characters of the two murderers are in general taken far too much for granted, and the very conscious attempt the picture makes to be bluntly and perceptively realistic, from the hero's match-sucking habit to the way Robinson slobbers his drink when he is excited, is a success to the degree that it is less synthetic than most Hollywood films, but it is certainly not less enough. Without going into the reasons for this for the fiftieth time, I can point out that the Russian film, "They Met in Moscow," is scene for scene more real-seeming and meaningful as realism, without making nearly so pretentious an attempt to be. I recommend "Double Indemnity," though, because the level of the work in it seems to me to be higher than it generally is in Hollywood, for the ingenuity and presentation of its first murder and for a lot of information about an interesting business—insurance.

I recommend also "They Met in Moscow," which does two very common Hollywood preoccupations—the musical films and cuteness—in a much pleasanter, fresher, more natural way than Hollywood does them. The plot of this operetta has a number of standard Sovietisms in it: an honored worker from the north, a swineherdess named Glasha, meets an honored worker from the south, a shepherd named Muzaitb, at the agricultural fair in Moscow; and after a year's separation, during which they raise more pigs and sheep than they or anybody ever did before, they get married. Glasha is an example of the Russian felicity for selecting a heroine whose tomboy cuteness seems most diverting and fresh, from her homemade kind of Jackie Coogan haircut to her even more homemade make-up. The acting styles, way of singing, looks and dress of the players are distinct in each case and seem completely natural to them. I was very taken with the teeth-gnashing, passionate style of the hero, the breakneck speed at which he rode his horse home from the fair and the fact that he and his shepherding friends conversed mainly by shouting. His adenoidal singing, the heroine's soprano, the comic's manner, all have an energy, roughness, individuality and charm detrimentally lacking in Hollywood musicals like "Two Girls and a Sailor." These Russian players seem to be genuinely involved in whatever they are doing.

MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

... the Negro issue is not acute in Virginia: almost a dozen Negro delegate votes were cast and accepted at Roanoke. — *From The New York Times.*

He [Bromley, Esquire's lawyer] said Esquire is comparable in all respects to The Saturday Evening Post and The Ladies Home Journal. — *From PM.*

Bedtime Story

The Brickers have a little boy, Jackie. He and his father are inseparable. Together, they are just two boys. Jackie was at the convention, distributing buttons and handbills, running errands and having the time of his life. And then he discovered, as a cruel world would have it, that his father was not to be the President of the United States. Jackie continued to distribute buttons and handbills, but Jackie was hit hard. . . . After

Bricker had decided to accept the vice-presidential nomination, some of us were discussing the events that led up to it and one old friend said: "He had to do it. He could not break Jackie's heart." — *George Sokolsky in his syndicated column.*

Strange Bedfellows

No Tennessee draft registrants over 26, except volunteers, delinquents, farm-jumpers, morals cases or federal employees, are to be ordered up for pre-induction examinations or inductions into the army and navy, under instructions issued . . . to all draft boards in the state. — *From The Nashville Tennessean.*

Total-War Department

Bomb socks are the latest fad for London dogs. National Canine Defense League clinics, which have been treating a large number of dogs for foot injuries caused by cuts from glass splinters, have advised owners to examine their pets daily if they walk in bombed areas, and make them wear socks made of old gloves. — *UP dispatch from London.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; \$1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. — THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Speaker Rayburn and the FCC

SIR: Representative Jerry Voorhis, in his communication about Speaker Rayburn [The New Republic, July 10], told how at a time when the Cox Committee had been created to investigate the Federal Communications Commission, when the Dies Committee had made all sorts of accusations against the Commission, it was Rayburn who saved its life by speaking against an amendment to the supply bill that would have cut off the Commission's funds. But if I remember correctly, The New Republic thought it shocking that when the FCC had revealed that Cox had improperly accepted a fee from a broadcasting station, the House acted to investigate not Cox but the FCC, and that Cox was placed in charge of the investigation. And I would like to know from Representative Voorhis or yourself whether Rayburn spoke out against this, and whether it wasn't Rayburn who as Speaker appointed not only Cox but others like him to the investigating committee. While I am at it, I also would like to know whether Rayburn ever spoke out against the practices of the Dies Committee.

B. H. HAGGIN

New York City

Don't Tamper with the Little Steel Formula

SIR: In a recent issue of The New Republic you argue that the "Little Steel" formula should be abolished on the ground that "wage rates have been held stationary," while the cost of living has gone up. As a matter of fact, the increase in the cost of living, which for the past year has been completely checked, amounted to but 4.4 percent from September, 1942, when wage control received legislative sanction, to December, 1943. But this slight economic disadvantage—which by the way did not affect the considerable proportion of employees whose wage rates were *not* frozen—was far more than counterbalanced by gains in the actual income of industrial labor as a body, gains which were due in large part to the lengthening of working hours combined with the system of excess pay for overtime and Sunday work. Thus, in the case of factory employees, who form the great majority of industrial workers, average hourly earnings and average weekly wages increased respectively 11 and 15 percent from September, 1942, to December, 1943.

Surely also the 90-percent gain in average weekly earnings for factory employees, as compared with a 24-percent rise in cost of living since the opening of the war, has some bearing on the case. The same is true of certain other solid economic advantages gained by industrial labor as a direct result of the war, notably the virtual elimination of unemployment, which was a major economic evil for labor in the prewar period; and the increase of opportunities for employment of previously

dependent members of employees' families, so that in many cases family incomes must far exceed the prewar level.

In further support of your position you state that "the average increase of income per wage earner since the war began has been less than the average increase of income per farmer, or per person on farms." Here you cite only one economic advantage gained by each of the two groups compared. As a matter of elementary fairness, account should be taken of *all* the gains of labor which are traceable to the war, as I have just enumerated them, and in addition, to an important countervailing factor in relation to the farmer—namely, that his increased gains are not due solely to the war but also to the extraordinarily good crop conditions during the past two years, so that there is no certainty or even likelihood that these gains will be maintained during the rest of the war period. If space would allow it, I might also give reasons for believing that your comparison of the gains of corporations from the war with those of labor is hardly relevant to the question of abandoning the Little Steel formula.

Estimates of comparative gains by the groups which have profited by the war, however, have no great significance. Large numbers of gainfully employed people, such as white-collar workers and salaried persons, have had no substantial increase in their incomes during the war. Families of men in the service are in many cases forced to live on a fraction of what they formerly had. To all of these people the abandonment of the Little Steel formula would probably mean still greater impoverishment, since such a step would be a serious blow to the wage-price-control structure and would almost certainly accelerate the rise in living costs.

The College of Emporia, Emporia, Kan.

F. R. FLOURNOY

[1. It is not pertinent to compare increases in wage *earnings* with increase in *prices* which make up the cost of living, for several reasons. Workers who have gained because of longer hours are entitled to the gain as well as corporations or farmers who have profited from larger volume of production. On the other hand, many workers have not been able to increase their incomes through working more, and should be protected from the encroachments of rising living costs.

The intention of the "Little Steel" formula was to equalize advances in *wage rates* with the rise in the cost of living between the entry of the United States into the war and the date of the adoption of the formula. This intention was not realized, because the rise in the cost of living has been several points higher than the 15-percent wage increases allowed. It would not be an abandonment of the stabilization policy to rectify this disparity. Nor would it be inflationary, since in most cases the additional cost could be absorbed by employers without raising prices.

2. Why should families who have fuller employment because more of their members are working be deprived of the fruits of their labor? We do not pay wages to families, but to individuals; there would be no justice in keeping the family income stationary in spite of additional work. There are, moreover, many individuals not attached to families with additional working members. If it is true that farmers (whose prices have been allowed to rise more than wage rates) may suffer from crop failures, it is also true that wage earners may suffer from layoffs through termination of contracts, and certainly are in danger of postwar unemployment.

Let us keep the scales even—stabilize *prices* and *wage rates*—the one as much as and no more than the other. People in most occupations will then gain by larger volume of output, but the remedy for that is progressive income taxation and inducement of the heaviest possible volume of savings. —THE EDITORS]

What to Do with German Youth

SIR: Occasionally we get hints of what is going on in the minds of our enemies, and these hints may be of use to us in determining our policy when a victorious peace is established. We are fairly well agreed that our main purpose is to make it impossible for the aggressor nations to bring about a third World War, and I wish to offer a suggestion based on a hint that the Germans have given us.

It is natural enough that the approach of defeat and disaster should lead the less wary of the once so boastful Nazis to threaten vengeance in another war, and to back their threats with a show of evidence. It is salve to their wounds to think of what they will do when another generation has reached military age. They have for some time been producing a swarm of illegitimate "state children" to be reared "according to plan," and now they point to these and proclaim openly that they will be ready for the conflict when it comes.

We have debated the possibility of educating German children so that they would be peace-loving and anti-Nazi in their attitude, and we have known, or should have known, all along that a foreign teacher in a German environment would be crying against the wind. Setting aside the question of educating the legitimate children who will grow up in German homes and become the backbone of the nation, let us give our attention to the matter of educating the children who are born out of wedlock. They will compose a very considerable portion of the armed forces when another world war comes—if it comes in the quarter-century or less when it would be due.

Let us therefore, when we occupy Germany, do a kindness to these expendables as well as to ourselves and our own children by removing them and educating them in the various Allied countries. Taken in infancy or very early childhood, they would grow up as our friends and not our enemies: the debate of heredity v. environment has established this much. They would bear names characteristic of the countries in which they were reared: English, French, Scandinavian, Polish or Irish as the case might be. The heartless and dastardly scheme of bringing children into the world with the deliberate purpose of having them butchered while butchering us would be turned against the perpetrators of it. They would face the frightening realization that what they have done is not to produce the material for another army to fight for them, but to produce material for an army to fight, if necessary, against them—a most discouraging factor in any plans for another war. If it discouraged also the practice of promiscuity, that surely is not an objection.

These children are without parental ties. No cruel injustice would be done them or their parents by saving them from the barbarity that produced them. Some of the United Nations have been worried over a declining birth rate; their enemies

have kindly solved that problem for them! The Germans are no master race, as we know well enough, but we are inclined to forget that they have produced many geniuses in the arts and sciences, and many substantial citizens in our own country; and it might be worth the world's while to rescue the possible contributors to civilization and culture that the Germans have placed at our disposal. As they would not be regarded as Germans but treated as natives of the countries adopting them, they would not need to be restricted by the immigration quota, but the need of the various Allies for new blood would of course be the determining factor in the distribution.

The cost of rearing these Nazi waifs and educating them into supporters instead of threateners of our way of life would be considerable. Some might complain that our first duty is to our own illegitimates. But the cost must be met either by the Germans or the Allies; and to put the cost upon Germany, and renew the danger of an overpopulated country, would be bad economics and bad statecraft.

Stanford University, Calif.

H. D. GRAY

Censored

SIR: For the enclosed 20 cents in stamps please send me your supplements for May 18, 1942, and May 8, 1944, regarding "A Congress to Win the War" and "A Congress to Win the War and the Peace." As you are no doubt aware, the army has prohibited the purchase of your magazine with army funds, preferring such "non-political" publications as *The Saturday Evening Post*. We still may spend our own money for information, however.

W. A. R.

From The New Republic Mail Bag

International Labor Defense, headed by Representative Vito Marcantonio, writes asking our endorsement of a plea to the President for clemency on behalf of two Negro soldiers, Frank Fisher Jr. and Edward R. Lorry. Fisher and Lorry were convicted and sentenced on charges of rape by a military court, while serving in New Caledonia, were dishonorably discharged from the army and given long prison terms. International Labor Defense is appealing for unconditional pardon for these men on the grounds that no evidence of coercion on the part of the soldiers was produced and that "third-degree" methods were used by the military police to obtain confessions. A plea is being made for reinstatement of Fisher and Lorry in the armed forces, in the event their freedom is secured.

J. S. Lopoak of Los Angeles urges a postwar organization not based on "malignant" nationalism, but recognizing that there is "no real difference between [nations] on questions of 'right' and 'wrong.'" A committee composed of one member from each nation "could be made to sound like the voice of the world," he says, "and should be accepted if only to avoid further trouble."

Industrialization of China as a means of providing ourselves with a strong ally against future aggression is suggested by John Bland of Spearfish, South Dakota. "Putting the Chinese awheel" in the postwar period could be accomplished through the collective efforts of the United States and China, and the conversion would provide us with new markets and ensure us against economic stagnation.

The National Council for a Permanent Fair Employment Practice Committee writes to thank us for an editorial of June 12, in support of the FEPC. The Scanlon-Dawson-La Follette bill, now before the House Labor Committee, would give the FEPC permanent status and authority, and the council feels that unless such legislation is enacted, the committee "will be abolished when the war ends and the problem of discrimination in employment becomes even more critical."

Books in Review

Everybody's Earwicker

ULYSSES" WAS INTRODUCED to the world by a lecture, and followed at a short distance by an official commentary. "Finnegans Wake," than which no book ever stood in greater need of such accompaniments, dropped into the beginning of the present war like an unexploded block-buster. The articles in *Transition*, though they threw out valuable hints, had done little to soften up the public. Reviews and critiques, on the basis of conjectural interpretations, arrived at provisional opinions. The possibility that first-hand records of Joyce's intentions survive, and may be brought to light after the war, holds much interest and possibly—for those of us who have already stuck out our necks—some embarrassment. Meanwhile we can admire the bravery and excuse the brashness of Joseph Campbell and Henry Morton Robinson,¹ who have undertaken to tell us what Joyce really meant. A skeleton key is admittedly an ingenious makeshift, exactly what the situation calls for. Joycean exegesis is still work in progress; here, pending further revelations, is an encouraging report. That it springs from a journalistic impetus is all to the good, for the common reader must sooner or later come to speaking terms with Joyce. Coteries and colleges "may own the targum," as he suggests, but his books are best appreciated by "Zingari shooleirim," by scholar-gypsies like himself.

It must be admitted that Buckley is still caviar to the Russian general: that Joyce, in plain language, is far from becoming a household word. It is not for nothing, however, that Mr. Robinson edits *The Reader's Digest*. If "Finnegans Wake" remains somewhat indigestible after he and Mr. Campbell have boiled it down, the fault is not theirs. The fact that their methods of high-pressure condensation have been so successfully applied is a devastating comment on the loose writing of contemporary periodicals. Joyce's style, with its rigorous controls and multiple connotations, resists such treatment. To reduce each successive page to a few key ideas and leading statements is often helpful; but it often involves an arbitrary choice between the literal and the figurative, a translation which is more opaque than the original, an emphasis on what one happens to understand at the expense of what Joyce may ultimately have intended. Where he wrote "homely and gauche as Swift," paraphrase cuts out "homely," shearing off the implied antithesis between Dublin and the Left Bank. Where "pandemon" is retained, without benefit of a context which implies both "pandemonium" and "pantomime," the word is meaningless. "You are a poorjoist, unctuous to polise nopebobbies" is paraphrased by "You are a pillar of society, unctuous to police," which ignores the pointed alternative: "You are a poor Joyce, anxious to please nobody."

Now Messrs. Campbell and Robinson are readers of evident gusto and good will. They know that reading

¹ A Skeleton Key to *Finnegans Wake*, by Joseph Campbell and Henry Morton Robinson. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 365 pages. \$3.50.

Joyce is a dynamic process which epitomizing cannot replace. The question is whether that process is facilitated by a running commentary, when it moves so fast that he who reads must run, and streamlines down to a basic jargon which is neither Joyce nor English. Digression is out, analysis is finessed, poetry and humor are sacrificed, in the effort to cover ground. In spite of the unavoidable repetitions, there is little time for establishing themes or indicating rhythms. Something, of course, must always be left to the imagination: noting that "curdinal numen" is Newman, the commentators sense other puns, and leave us to deduce that "marryng" and "weisswassh" are Manning and Wiseman. But what is their canon for glossing Quaker Oats and omitting Titus Oates? If a footnote is necessary to explain that "The Smirching of Venus" is a corrupt version of "The Merchant of Venice," can the reader be expected to recognize Oedipus in "swell foot"? Or to realize that "Autist Algy, the pulcherman" is self-conscious Swinburne, the lover of beauty, and that the passage discusses the problem of art and morality? One hesitates to assume that the commentators themselves are unaware of this, yet their method conceals as much as it reveals.

An introductory synopsis neatly conveys the whole story in eight pages; an intensive "demonstration" spends eight more in explicating Joyce's first page. Between these extremes of epitome and scholium, the middle ground is not so satisfactory. Every page brings its own difficulties. When conjecture is required, the Campbell-Robinson guess is as good as anybody's; their sins of omission, though many, are venial; their demonstrable misinterpretations and downright mistakes are not very frequent or important. Perhaps their identifications have been slightly affected by Mr. Earwicker's elusiveness: they mistake Lewis Carroll for Swift and confound Maximilian II of Bavaria with both Ludwig I and Ludwig II. The intrusion of their own puns and mixed metaphors is, to say the least, work of supererogation. When they speak in their collaborative person, the style becomes so turgid and strident that it seriously distracts us from attuning our ears to Joyce. They render him no service by venting extravagant assertions which cannot withstand scrutiny. It is a tenable proposition, if not precisely the expression Joyce would have used, to say: "He had sucked Latin in with the milk of his Jesuit education." It controverts internal and external evidence to add: "With Greek, Sanskrit, Gaelic and Russian he was on terms of scholarly intimacy." Of those particular languages—it is relevant to observe—he had merely an adroit smattering.

It is reassuring that Messrs. Campbell and Robinson have made use of their predecessors' efforts, for it testifies to a substantial body of critical agreement upon the outline and many details of "Finnegans Wake." Their contribution is to offer, for the first time, a consecutive full-length account. They have worked out, along the way, some interesting and convincing elucidations: the travesty on the Book of Kells, the historical allegory of the Mookse and the Gripes, the numerical correspondences and liturgical echoes.

Joyce's crude sketch of a nose being thumbed is invested with its due cabalistic significance. There are a few symptoms of the scholiast's occupational disease, the tendency to read things into his text: "Capellisato" could not, by any stretch of Joycean linguistics, be Buddha's birthplace, Kapilavastu. Then there is the contrary habit of overlooking the obvious: forgetting, in the welter of metaphysics, that "Tiberiast duplex" refers to the Vatican and its occupant. The recommendation of a week-end with Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Idea" to clarify a parenthetical remark, *obscurum per obscurius*, is a counsel of light-minded despair. The superficial and misleading treatment of Joyce's acknowledged philosophical authorities, Vico and Bruno, is less excusable. And there is no excuse whatsoever for the lack of an index; the publishers, while claiming that the volume is "indispensable," have dispensed with the one feature that could make it so.

Joyce's exponents are still suffering from an excess of hierophantic zeal, a belief that what must be so laboriously decoded must somehow contain a message of mystical profundity. His real secrets are matters of literary technique, which the present study scarcely professes to explore. Nonetheless, by exploring the continuity of the book, it confirms the impression that "Finnegans Wake" is not a scrambled novel, ready to reward the unscrambler with a straightforward narrative; that its main threads are not personal associations but imaginative projections. Some of the actual objects and incidents of Earwicker's night—the train, the meat-safe—may be slighted; but there is ample compensation in the stress laid upon ritual, folklore and mythology. That all this should be the stuff of a tavern-keeper's dream seems more incredible than ever. Yet it expresses the paradox that prompted Joyce to frame, with his uncommon learning and virtuosity, a composite portrait of the common man. In digesting that paradox, in closing the gap between Joyce and the public, we shall need such assistance as comes our way. The helpfulness of the "Skeleton Key" should not be underestimated; nor should it, on the other hand, be relied upon too confidently. Crib and criticism are, at best, poor substitutes for the sympathetic audience that was never quite vouchsafed to the most gifted writer of our language in our century.

HARRY LEVIN

Argentine Fascism

Argentine Diary: The Inside Story of the Coming of Fascism, by Ray Josephs. New York: Random House. 358 pages. \$3.

COMPARISON of PM correspondent Ray Josephs' diary notes with his earlier news dispatches is a disillusioning experience. The information in both his diary and dispatches is pretty much the same, often to the point of being clothed in identical sentences and paragraphs. Hence this diary in "journalese" is altogether devoid of the intimate personal touch.

With the raw material on hand, the book could have been not only a fast-moving, journalistic description of the unfolding Argentine fascism, but also a searching analysis of its causes and prospects. As it turns out, the diary is neither. References to topically related events—foreign

policy, censorship, Axis scheming, personalities, army control, anti-trade unionism, etc.—are scattered through the book, not even held together by an adequate subject-matter index. In spite of the overwhelming evidence produced by the hard-working Mr. Josephs, his opinions about the reasons for and the future of Argentine fascism are haphazard and inconclusive.

Mr. Josephs does not give a satisfactory explanation of the *raison d'être* of Argentine fascism. Is it just a military puppet show? Why could a mere handful of army officers succeed in subjugating the politically most articulate people in Latin America, 80 percent of whom are pro-democratic, unless Argentine fascism, like its European precursors, had its deep economic, social and psycho-pathological causes? If Argentina's pro-democratic masses are so strong, why did they not revolt, even prior to the coup of June 4, 1943, which brought the military clique into power? Mr. Josephs gravely neglects the role played by the land-owning class as fascist-makers. And he has little to say about the conflicts within the labor movement that were partially responsible for the political weakness of the democratic forces in Argentina. Does he accept the explanation given by the military themselves to justify their revolt, *i.e.*, the administrative abuses of the previous government, their corruption and inefficiency?

Although Mr. Josephs occasionally refers to Argentine history to give perspective to recent events, for the novice, unacquainted with the background, the book is a hard nut to crack. There are, to give just one example, many references to the Radical Party, but nowhere is there any information about its great role in Argentine politics, its program or its followers. Mr. Josephs, for reasons known only to himself, carefully avoids saying who are and who are not real Communists among those whom the Argentine dictatorship persecutes for allegedly being Communists.

Even as a handy reference book "Argentine Diary" is useless. The last-minute index, apparently put in by the publishers, is totally inadequate, doing more harm than good. References are either completely lacking or partial. Gustavo Martínez Zuviría, the anti-Semitic Minister, does not appear at all in the index, nor do many other important personalities. The "Alianza de la Juventud Nacionalista," a nationalistic youth organization, is indexed to page 23, where it is mentioned only incidentally, but not to page 265, where it is described in detail. Also objectionable is the frequent and affected use of Spanish where English words would do.

Mr. Allen Chase, in his foreword, states that Mr. Josephs "will be celebrated in future histories of journalism as one of those hardy pioneers who proved to Latin Americans that not all *yanqui* reporters are gringos." Mr. Chase must have had in mind this gem of Puritan self-righteousness in the Josephs diary, dated July 17, that Buenos Aires "is still the hemisphere's dream town for people who want to have a good time. Pesos are free and easy and are being poured over the ticket windows, night-club tables and elsewhere with very little realization that practically everywhere else, the democracies and the dictatorships are locked in an increasingly powerful half-Nelson." Practically everywhere, it would seem, except New York, San Francisco, New Orleans and some other towns in the U. S. A.

HEINZ H. F. EULAU

Alternatives to the Novel

State of the Nation, by John Dos Passos. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company. 333 pages. \$3.

Rebel without a Cause: The Hypnoanalysis of a Criminal Psychopath, by Robert M. Lindner. Introduction by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck. New York: Grune and Stratton. 296 pages. \$4.

Lieutenant Bertram, by Bodo Uhse. New York: Simon and Schuster. 430 pages. \$2.50.

ONE OF THE FEW original contributions of Marxist literary criticism was, curiously enough, an attack on the novel. Robert Forsythe in a piece, "Down with the Novel," suggested that Vincent Sheean's "Personal History" was worth almost all the novels of young men growing up, and the late Ralph Fox closed his abortive but richly suggestive "The Novel and the People" with a "scheme" for a book about George Dimitrov as an alternative to political fiction. Strictly within the terms Forsythe and Fox were employing, it might be said that the novels of Malraux and Silone proved the adequacy of the form, but any inveterate reader of fiction must agree that a vast amount of the material that is thrust into the maw of the novel might better have been used straight, as autobiography, biography, reporting, history or criticism.

John Dos Passos has been out around the country—from Maine to Seattle, from San Francisco to Mobile. The magazine articles he wrote about his tour have been put into a book that is possibly his best since "The Big Money." Always a better historian and reporter than novelist, it is perhaps well that he has seen fit to record his observations of America at war in a series of evocative impressionistic articles rather than in fiction. His last novel, "Number One," failed because neither of the two chief characters were adequately explored. Character is the basis of the conventional novel—and "Number One" is a very conventional novel. The criticism does not apply so fully to "U. S. A." which is, in a larger degree than is generally recognized, a revolutionary book in which, through the careful arrangement of beautifully painted surfaces, an era of our history is unforgettably chronicled. But the characters are hardly remembered, for rarely do they take on intense, individualized existences; it is as a genuinely new form of the historical novel that "U. S. A." is memorable.

"State of the Nation," particularly in the chapters on Washington, D. C., goes beyond mere reporting, or rather in Dos Passos we have a reporter whose gifts lift his work to a plane that is qualitatively above what we call reporting. The sense of language that encompasses the hot, crowded city is matched only by the sense of history that records the end of the New Deal and the triumph of the war party.

The material of "Rebel without a Cause" might have made a very good novel. As it stands, a case history with the full record of the hypnoanalysis through which Dr. Lindner took a young criminal psychopath, it is the most exciting and one of the most deeply and tragically human stories I have read in a long time. According to the introduction, the book "is not intended for the layman," and it is published by a small medical publishing house, but it

will be regrettable if it is read only by the psychiatrists and penologists to whom it is addressed. Like Dr. Frederic Wertham's "Dark Legend: A Study in Murder," it deserves a far wider audience.

The "rebel" is a young Polish-American whose recorded criminal history began at the age of twelve, and who by the time he reached Dr. Lindner, a psychologist in a Pennsylvania penitentiary, had compiled a staggering list of criminal offenses. Under a lengthy analysis (the technique of which I have no competence to comment on) the boy's history is bared and the remote sources of his degeneracy brought to light. Dr. Lindner's summary of the case is an intelligent appraisal of the respective roles of society and the individual in criminal behavior.

Bodo Uhse, a German who reversed the too-familiar procession of Left to Right by deserting his early Nazism to become an anti-fascist, has put into his novel, "Lieutenant Bertram," material that might better have been employed as history or autobiography. It is one of those entwined novels: the story of a Luftwaffe group, from their training in Germany to their intervention in Spain, meshing with the story of an underground fighter who also goes to Spain. The reasons for the book's recurrent failure to be as good as it continually promises to be may be primarily technical: the shift from Germany to Spain cuts the book awkwardly in half, and the devices required to keep early characters actively in the narrative too often strain belief. Fiction, of course, must be more "verisimilitudinous" than life.

"Lieutenant Bertram" does, however, afford some real insights into modern Germany. It substantiates the belief that fascism is not an abrupt break with "normal" society, but an intensification of tendencies of capitalism in its imperialist stage. It suggests that even if National Socialism is uniquely German, fascism knows no national borders. And it does reveal that even Nazis are human—all too human.

GEORGE MAYBERRY

Finance and Public Policy

State and Local Finance in the National Economy, by Alvin H. Hansen and Harvey S. Perloff. New York: W. W. Norton. 310 pages. \$3.75.

MUCH has been written recently about taxes and fiscal policy in connection with the aim of maintaining full employment after the war. But the discussion has largely overlooked the important part played in the federal system of the United States by state and local finances. These have acted as an obstacle in the past to almost everything it is proposed to do through the fiscal policy of the federal government, and will do so again in the future unless some way is found of coordinating policy at all governmental levels.

This book is a thoroughgoing examination of the difficulties of the subordinate governmental units in the setting of an enlightened policy for national finances. The states differ widely in income, wealth and practices of taxation and spending. Educational expenditures, for instance, vary from \$30 to \$110 per child, and those states with the most children per thousand of population spend the least to educate them. There is a wide range of expenditure on

health and other essential services. Some states have income taxes and some do not; many states depend largely on sales and other regressive taxes. States and local governments cannot borrow during depression as easily as can the federal government; their credit is not good at such times. When they do borrow, the debt is frequently owed outside the community, like the foreign debt of a nation. Municipal governments are prevented from caring adequately for their populations by the fact that they must depend almost entirely on property taxes. Business taxes in bewildering variety hamper enterprise.

The authors present a program to remedy these defects. The program is detailed and many-sided, but its most important elements consist in close integration of state income taxes with the federal income tax, in such a way that the states will be induced to rely more largely on this source of revenue, plus more federal support for education, health and other services which are now hampered by the limited resources of localities. It does not involve any restriction of local autonomy in deciding how much to tax or in the utilization of central-government funds.

If the advocates of less federal activity and more "local self-government" have their way in the fiscal sphere, we shall have neither full employment nor a decent civilization. The authors have here shown that a coördinated and enlightened policy is possible, however, without the dreaded centralization of bureaucratic power.

This is a dull and technical problem, but unless it is solved, many bright hopes for the postwar world may fade in a gloomy dawn.

GEORGE SOULE

Hypnosis

What Is Hypnosis, by Andrew Salter. New York: Richard R. Smith, 88 pages. \$2.

IN THIS LITTLE book a successful practising hypnotist attempts to remove much of the mystery which surrounds hypnosis for the layman and professional alike by relating his own experiences and experiments to other recent psychological experiments outside his immediate field. Although his main thesis is oversimplified, he undoubtedly has taken a step in the right direction. Salter attempts to show that hypnosis is not a rare phenomenon in which one's individual conscious self in a trance is replaced by that of the hypnotist, but rather a learning situation leading to habitual responses through conditioning. The reflexologists since Pavlov have shown that involuntary unconscious responses may be easily conditioned to words. Salter presents the thesis that hypnosis is nothing but a pattern of specific conditionings. From this thesis he tries to explain hypnosis without the traditional concepts of "suggestion," "dissociation," "trance," "rapport," which at the best were descriptive rather than explanatory concepts. But it is scarcely sufficient to allow him to account adequately for many of the complex hypnotic phenomena. The steps by which the simple conditioning experiments of the laboratory become integrated into the complicated performances of the hypnotized subject are neither logically developed nor experimentally shown. Hypnosis still needs theories of motivation and interpersonal relationships to relate its findings to those of psychopathology.



The Liberal Party

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LIFE BEGINS WITH MARRIAGE

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Author of "Formula for 100 Years' Peace"

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If Salter's book is not completely satisfactory in demonstrating what hypnosis is, it does show us a great deal about what it is not. Most of the book is devoted to careful experiments on autohypnosis, wherein the individual rather than the hypnotist gives the suggestions. There are also experiments in which results commonly considered to be elicited only in hypnotic trance are brought about in the normal waking state. It is thus demonstrated, contrary to most popular and even some scientific opinion, that neither the hypnotist nor the trance state is essential to bringing about hypnotic results. Subjects in a waking state can train themselves to control their blood pressure and be insensitive to pain, noise, pressure and temperature changes. Further experiments show that it is not necessary for the operator to have a particular prestige to establish rapport. These experiments will fascinate the layman and undoubtedly stimulate further research among professionals.

To the reviewer, the positive contribution of this book lies in Salter's experiments rather than in his praiseworthy attempt at the simplification of theory. J. F. BROWN

A Reader's List

I SEE A NEW CHINA, by George Hogg (Little, Brown, \$2.50). If anyone is skeptical of the imminence of democracy in China, then let him look carefully into George Hogg's first-rate story of a new China. It tells of the vicissitudes which have gradually shaken the very roots of Chinese feudalism throughout the years, bringing in its place the present-day "Indusco." That is the name for the 2,400 industrial coöperative workshops which are now prevalent throughout China. These are workers' communities producing such essentials as shoes, clothes, munitions and their own books and newspapers. In addition, they are providing for education on a larger scale than ever before. In short, this is China's Industrial Revolution and her collective fight against her aggressors.

ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY, by Mae D. Huettig (Pennsylvania, \$2). This is an interestingly written and often engrossing recital of one of the most fascinating chapters in America's economic and cultural history. Mrs. Huettig's primary concern is the cinema's industrial organization. Yet the reader does get a fairly clear idea of the explosive social impact resulting from the wild growth of the movies. The author shows how monopoly, in the guise of the notorious Patent Pool of 1908, almost strangled the new-born industry in its crib. Were it not for the "independents," the motion-picture industry doubtless would still be a curious adjunct to the circus. Once their position was secure, however, the independents were equally adept at establishing their own monopolistic grip. Theatres, real-estate companies, film manufacturers, equipment firms, distribution channels and the actual filming of movies were integrated rapidly into vast and often fantastic industrial empires. Perhaps this explains why Hollywood is so disinclined to make the motion-picture industry a mature cultural institution.

AMERICAN HOUSING: Factual Findings, by Miles L. Coleman. Program by the Housing Committee (The Twentieth Century Fund, \$3). We are quite proud of the demonstrated ability of our industrial economy to meet the challenge of wartime needs. Yet the need for shelter, a basic requirement in peace and war, is ministered to by the most

archaic industry in American life. Here is the entire story, with nothing spared. Outmoded gridiron land subdivisions, traditional construction methods, the lack of specialization and the multiplicity of operators have culminated in a high cost, low-production pattern. The Fund indicates that some progress has been made in recent years, particularly in standardization and prefabrication. Yet it has been insufficient to warrant any hopes for a high level of activity after the war. There must be a greater desire on the part of builders, bankers and labor to fill the housing needs of a mass market. And that demands imagination, foresight and a willingness to surrender narrow group interests. This comprehensive volume describes the vast job of reconstruction that awaits us and urges that we prepare for it now.

COÖPERATION FOR WHAT? UNITED STATES AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, by F. R. Scott (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 25 cents). The major question raised by this well organized pamphlet becomes especially significant in the light of Winston Churchill's recent pronouncements. Coöperation to fulfill the promise of the four freedoms becomes increasingly dubious with the latter's recent delineation of policy. Yet the Allied war effort, says the author of this pamphlet, has shown that international action on military aims can be attained. The problem after the war is to substitute the aim of peace and security for the aim of victory. Mr. Scott stresses the common interests of the English-speaking nations as a basis for successful coöperation. These interests are, quite simply, the need for security from aggression, the need for a full-employment economy and the need for an extension of democracy. Though Mr. Scott at times seems overoptimistic, he does state the crucial issues plainly and fairly.

Contributors

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